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Abstract The human ability to perform joint actions is often
attributed to high-level cognitive processes. For example, the
finding that action leaders act faster when imitated by their
partners has been interpreted as evidence for anticipation of
the other’s actions (Pfister, Dignath, Hommel, & Kunde,
2013). In two experiments, we showed that a low-level mech-
anism can account for this finding. Action leaders were faster
when imitated than when counterimitated, but only if they
could observe their partner’s actions (Exp. 1). Crucially, when
due to our manipulation the partner’s imitative actions became
slower than the counterimitative actions, leaders also became
slower when they were imitated, and faster when
counterimitated (Exp. 2). Our results suggest that spontaneous
temporal adaptation is a key mechanism in joint action tasks.
We argue for a reconsideration of other phenomena that have
traditionally been attributed solely to high-level processes.
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When people engage in a joint activity, they tend to closely
coordinate their actions. For example, a couple enjoying a
night stroll on the beach might walk in synchrony, holding
hands and jointly navigating to avoid puddles of water. This
could be viewed as a case of planned coordination—one that
results from shared representations of the desired outcome and
the actions necessary to achieve it. However, coordination can
also emerge spontaneously, independent of complex represen-
tations and high-level cognitive processes (Knoblich,
Butterfill, & Sebanz, 2011). For example, the couple on the
beach might coordinate their footsteps as a result of low-level
automatic mechanisms present in both agents. In this article,
we focus on one such mechanism—that is, temporal adapta-
tion. We propose that spontaneous temporal adaptation can
account for some findings that have previously been taken
as evidence that agents represent and anticipate each other’s
actions.
A great deal of research supports the notion that agents
successfully coordinate their actions via high-level processes.
For instance, people acting together form and pursue joint
goals (Loehr & Vesper, 2016), are aware of each other’s fo-
cuses of attention (Böckler, Knoblich, & Sebanz, 2012),
mentalize about their coactors’ perspectives (Ryskin,
Benjamin, Tullis, & Brown-Schmidt, 2015) and beliefs (van
der Wel, Sebanz, & Knoblich, 2014), and form precise repre-
sentations of each other’s actions (Sebanz, Bekkering, &
Knoblich, 2006) and their anticipated outcomes (Pfister,
Dolk, Prinz, & Kunde, 2014).
However, there is also clear evidence that people coordi-
nate by engaging simpler mechanisms. Temporal adaptation is
a low-level mechanism that is particularly important for inter-
personal coordination (Konvalinka, Vuust, Roepstorff, &
Frith, 2010) and has been shown to often occur automatically
(Keller, 2008; Mills, van der Steen, Schultz, & Keller, 2015).
Many forms of human interaction are shaped by the tendency
to adapt to each other’s actions. For example, musicians
playing a duet adjust their subsequent performance to correct
for asynchronies (Goebl & Palmer, 2009), audiences fall into
one clapping rhythm (Neda, Ravasz, Brechte, Vicsek, &
Barabasi, 2000), interlocutors align on patterns of body sway
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(Fowler, Richardson, Marsh, & Shockley, 2008), and people
rocking in rocking chairs spontaneously synchronize the fre-
quencies of their movements (Richardson, Marsh, Isenhower,
Goodman, & Schmidt, 2007).
We believe that adopting a more low-level perspective can
inform the efforts to create a comprehensive framework of
joint action. Importantly, it can help to address the criticisms
that have been proposed against some of the high-level ac-
counts. For instance, mental inferences (Shintel & Keysar,
2009) and anticipation (Pfister, Pfeuffer, & Kunde, 2014) are
time-consuming and effortful in terms of cognitive resources,
suggesting that their widespread use is unlikely. Furthermore,
it has been argued that some aspects of joint action (e.g.,
synchronization in time) are best explained via low-level
mechanisms rather than via common coding and other repre-
sentational theories (Schmidt, Fitzpatrick, Caron, &
Mergeche, 2011). Most importantly, recent studies have sug-
gested that phenomena that have traditionally been interpreted
in terms of complex, high-level processes can in fact be ex-
plained by much simpler mechanisms (see Dolk et al., 2014,
for a review). Here we show that the apparent effect of antic-
ipation of a coactor’s action on one’s own action is one such
phenomenon.
Anticipation has been advanced as being key for successful
coordination between agents (Knoblich & Jordan, 2003;
Kourtis, Sebanz, & Knoblich, 2013). It has been suggested
that anticipating the sensory consequences of one’s own ac-
tion can activate the motor program that normally produces
this act ion (Hommel, 2013; Hommel, Müsseler,
Aschersleben, & Prinz, 2001). For example, in one classic
study the button presses of a participant were followed by a
light effect whose location was either compatible or incom-
patible with the location of the presses. Actions were initiated
faster in the compatible effect condition, suggesting that par-
ticipants anticipated the location of the effect and used it as a
cue to activate the motor program for a spatially correspond-
ing press (Kunde, 2001). In joint action, anticipating the part-
ner’s response could cue the agent to activate the action that
typically causes this response (Müller, 2015; Pfister, Dolk,
Prinz, & Kunde, 2014). Such anticipation could prime the
execution of complementary movements, ultimately benefit-
ing any activity that requires two people to coordinate their
actions.
One striking demonstration of this process has come from a
recent study by Pfister, Dignath, Hommel, and Kunde (2013).
In this study, one participant acted as a leader and performed a
short or a long button press in response to a cue on the com-
puter screen. Her partner acted as a follower and was
instructed to perform either the same (imitation) or the oppo-
site (counterimitation) type of press. The study showed that
the leader initiated her actions faster when she was imitated.
The authors interpreted this as evidence for anticipation of the
follower’s movements, in line with the literature on
compatibility effects and the ideomotor theory (Hommel
et al., 2001). However, the follower’s actions were not just
compatible in the imitation condition and incompatible in
the counterimitation condition; the authors also reported that
the follower was faster in the former than in the latter condi-
tion. In fact, a large body of research has shown that action
execution is facilitated for imitative movements (see Heyes,
2011, for a review).
We propose that a much simpler temporal-adaptation
mechanism can account for this finding: The leader adapted
her response speed to the follower’s—that is, speeding up
when her partner performed the faster imitative movements,
and slowing down when he performed the slower
counterimitative movements. Although most of the evidence
for temporal adaptation has come from research on rhythmic,
continuous movements (e.g., Repp, 2005; Repp & Su, 2013),
some studies suggest it can also occur in nonrhythmic, dis-
crete tasks (Jung, Holländer, Müller, & Prinz, 2011). We hy-
pothesized that temporal adaptation may play a key role in our
task, although this task has previously been used to investigate
high-level processes.
We investigated this hypothesis in two experiments. In
Experiment 1, we cancelled out visual and auditory feedback
about the followers’ performance. We hypothesized that if the
effect on leaders’ response times (RTs) is due to temporal
adaptation, it should disappear after removing perceptual in-
formation about the follower’s behavior. In Experiment 2, we
manipulated followers’ responses to elicit a reversed RT pat-
tern—that is, faster in counterimitation, slower in imitation. If
leaders were to accommodate their response speed to this
atypical pattern, this would be strong evidence in favor of
the adaptation hypothesis.
Experiment 1
Methods
We invited 24 previously unacquainted participants (20
female, 4 male; all right-handed) to form same-gender pairs.
This sample size was chosen on the basis of Pfister et al.
(2013). The participants were Edinburgh University students
with no reported motor disorders and were paid £6 for their
time. The study was approved by the Psychology Research
Ethics Committee at Edinburgh University, and informed con-
sent was obtained from all participants.
Participants were randomly assigned the roles of leader and
follower andwere seated across a table. In each trial, the leader
watched the computer screen change color from black to ei-
ther red or green, indicating a short (1–150ms) or a long (200–
600 ms) response. The color–response mapping was
counterbalanced between pairs. The follower was instructed
to observe the leader’s action and to perform the same
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(compatible; imitation condition) or the opposite (incompati-
ble; counterimitation condition) type of button press. After the
follower’s response the screen turned black for 1,000 ms, and
then the next trial started. The participants were instructed to
perform their actions as quickly as possible. The total duration
of a trial was 4,000 ms: initial black screen (500 ms) + color
cue (2,500 ms) + end trial black screen (1,000 ms).
We presented 14 practice trials at the beginning of each
session to familiarize participants with the two press types.
After practice, the participants completed one imitation and
one counterimitation block. Then they switched roles and
completed two more blocks, so that each person completed
the task both as leader and as follower. Each block consisted
of 120 trials, and the order of blocks was counterbalanced
between pairs.
To remove visual and auditory feedback about the fol-
lower’s performance, we placed a divider between partici-
pants. This setup allowed the follower to see the leader’s hand
and the button box, while the leader could not see the follower
at all (Fig. 1, panel a). Furthermore, the leader wore earplugs,
as well as noise-cancelling headphones (Sony MDR-NC60).
To make sure that participants knew what type of response
would be performed by their partner in each condition, the
instructions were carefully explained to them at the beginning
of the session and then repeated before the start of each block
(i.e., leaders were told the color–response mapping, informed
whether it was an imitation or counterimitation block, and
asked to explain how the follower would respond to their
actions). At the end of the session, participants were paid
and debriefed.
Results
Following Pfister et al. (2013), we discarded the first 24 trials
from each block (warm-up trials). Prior to the analyses of the
leader’s responses, we excluded all trials in which the leader
performed the wrong type of press (3.03%).We also excluded
outliers deviating more than 2.5 SDs from each participant’s
condition mean (2.02 %). For the follower’s analyses, we
excluded trials in which either participant made an error
(8.87 %), and further trimmed the data to remove the fol-
lower’s outliers (1.91 %).1 Below we focus on the effect of
imitation versus counterimitation, both overall and separately
for each type of leader’s press; see the supplemental material
for the full analysis of variance (ANOVA) results.
We replicated the well-established imitation facilitation ef-
fect: Followers’ RTs were shorter in the imitation than in the
counterimitation condition (M = 318 vs. 459 ms), t(23) = 5.79,
p < .001, 95 % confidence interval (CI) = [92, 195] (all
reported t tests are two-tailed). To check whether this effect
was independent of the leader’s response type, we ran follow-
up pairwise comparisons for short and long leader presses (all
subsequent analyses refer to the leader’s press type). We ob-
served a significant difference (Bonferroni p = .025) between
the imitation and counterimitation conditions for both long
presses (M = 308 vs. 392 ms), t(23) = 2.82, p = .010, r =
.51, 95 % CI = [24, 154], and short presses (M = 328 vs.
526 ms), t(23) = 7.64, p < .001, r = .85, 95 % CI = [148,
258]. This shows that in imitation followers initiated their
actions faster, regardless of the type of response performed
by the leaders.
Importantly, however, leaders were not faster when they
were imitated than when they were counterimitated, suggest-
ing that removing perceptual feedback considerably attenuat-
ed any influence of the partner’s performance (M = 434 vs.
441 ms), t(23) = 1.20, p = .241, r = .24, 95 % CI = [–5, 19]
(Fig. 2, panel a). Follow-up pairwise comparisons showed no
difference between imitation and counterimitation for long
presses (M = 444 vs. 443 ms), t(23) = –0.15, p > .250, r =
.03, 95 % CI = [–16, 13]. For short presses, the p value for the
condition effect was just below the conventional alpha thresh-
old, but not below the threshold after correction for multiple
comparisons (M = 425 vs. 440 ms), t(23) = 2.10, p = .047, r =
.40, 95 % CI = [0, 29] (Bonferroni p = .025).
Fig. 1 The set-up of Experiments 1 and 2. Panel a shows Experiment 1: p
The leader is seated on the right-hand side of the divider. The diagonal
positioning of the button boxes allows the follower to see both his and the
leader’s hands, while the leader can see only her own hand. Panel b shows
Experiment 2: The participants can freely observe each other
1 Outlier rejection did not affect the results in any of the analyses reported
in this article: The same pattern of results was obtained when outliers
were retained (see the supplemental material).
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Discussion
Our results suggest that the effect on leaders’ RTs reported by
Pfister et al. (2013) was not due to anticipation. If it were, we
should have observed a reliable difference between the condi-
tions even when leaders were unable to observe the followers’
actions. There is evidence that coactors seated in separate
rooms can represent each other’s actions (Atmaca, Sebanz,
& Knoblich, 2011; Gambi, Van de Cavey, & Pickering,
2015). Therefore, a strong version of the anticipation account
would predict that merely knowing whether the partner would
respond with a compatible or an incompatible action should
influence the leader’s action execution (Pfister, Pfeuffer, &
Kunde, 2014).
However, it is possible that by cancelling perceptual feed-
back we made it impossible for the leader to represent the
follower’s response as a consequence of their action. Under
a weaker version of the anticipation account, leaders integrate
the followers’ actions into representations of the outcomes of
their own actions only if they can directly observe the fol-
lowers. Therefore, in Experiment 2 we reintroduced feedback
and manipulated the followers’ response speed so that they
initiated their button presses faster in counterimitation than in
imitation. If the weak version of the anticipation account is
correct, we would expect leaders to show an imitation facili-
tation effect. However, if leaders simply adapt to the speed
with which followers respond, they should now be faster in
counterimitation than in imitation.
Experiment 2
Methods
We recruited a further 48, previously unacquainted partici-
pants (36 female, 12 male; all right-handed with no motor
disorders; they formed same-gender pairs). The participants
were Edinburgh University students and were paid £6. An
additional pair of participants was tested but was excluded
from the study prior to data analysis (one participant from that
pair reported being left-handed after completing the task).
Ethical approval and participants’ consent were obtained as
in Experiment 1.
We used the same setup and stimuli as in Experiment 1,
although this time participants could see and hear each other;
that is, there was no divider, and the leader did not wear ear-
plugs or headphones (Fig. 1, panel b). As previously, we asked
the followers to observe the leaders and to produce either the
same (imitation) or the opposite (counterimitation) type of
press. In addition, followers were now asked to wear head-
phones (Sony MDR-NC60), and we explained that they
would hear some auditory cues. In the imitation block, fol-
lowers heard a single-tone BGO signal^ (160 ms, 800 Hz)
played 800–1,075 ms after the onset of the trial. They were
instructed to withhold their response until they had heard the
tone. In counterimitation, followers heard either a short
(80 ms) or a long (240 ms, 800 Hz) single tone, played at trial
onset. We told them that the short tone indicated they would
need to perform a short press, and conversely, the long tone
indicated a long press. The followers were instructed to use
these cues to prepare their responses to the upcoming leader’s
actions.
The instructions were given to the follower separately so
that the leader was unware of the purpose of the auditory cues.
Fig. 2 Mean leaders’ and followers’ response times (RTs) in imitation
and counterimitation. Error bars represent 95 % confidence intervals.
Panel a shows results from Experiment 1, panel b results from
Experiment 2
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However, each participant acted in both roles throughout the
experiment. Half of the participants started as leader and then
swapped roles, to perform the task again as a follower. Hence,
these participants were unaware of the auditory cue instruc-
tions while acting as a leader. The other half of the participants
started as a follower and then carried on to be leader. This
group was therefore aware of the follower’s instructions while
they acted as leader. To accommodate this new between-
participants factor, we increased the sample size as specified
above. Leaders received instructions identical to those in
Experiment 1.
Results
As in Experiment 1, warm-up trials, error trials (3.59 %), and
outliers (2.13 %) were removed before analyzing the leader’s
responses. Error trials for both participants (18.04 %), as well
as further outliers (1.33 %), were excluded for the follower’s
analyses.
With regard to the follower’s behavior, we successfully
reversed the typical RT pattern (Fig. 2, panel b). Followers
were now significantly slower in the imitation than in the
counterimitation condition (M = 654 vs. 298 ms), t(47) = –
16.23, p < .001, r = .92, 95 % CI = [–402, –314], and pairwise
comparisons showed that this was the case for both long lead-
er presses (M = 533 vs. 286 ms), t(47) = –10.45, p < .001, r =
.84, 95 % CI = [–302, –204], and short leader presses (M =
781 vs. 310ms), t(47) = –21.06, p < .001, r = .95, 95%CI = [–
512, –423]. See the supplemental material for the full ANOVA
results.
Crucially, we observed the same pattern in leaders’ RTs:
Leaders were significantly slower in imitation than in
counterimitation (M = 470 vs. 450 ms), t(47) = –3.06, p =
.004, r = .41, 95 % CI = [–31, –6] (Fig. 2, panel b). Again,
this difference was significant both for long (M = 481 vs.
462 ms), t(47) = –2.78, p = .008, r = .38, 95 % CI = [–31, –
5], and short (M = 459 vs. 439 ms), t(47) = –2.87, p = .006, r =
.39, 95 % CI = [–33, –6], presses. Furthermore, it was not
affected by whether the leaders were aware of the followers’
instructions. A 2 (Condition: imitation vs. counterimitation) ×
2 (Leader Press Type: short vs. long) × 2 (Leader Awareness:
aware vs. unaware) mixed ANOVA showed that the interac-
tion between condition and leader awareness was not signifi-
cant [F(1, 46) = 2.90, p = .095, ηG
2 < .01]. All other interac-
tions were also nonsignificant (Fs < 1).
These results may indicate that leaders adapted their re-
sponse speed to their partners’. To further test this, we calcu-
lated the mean difference between the imitation and
counterimitation conditions for each participant acting as ei-
ther follower or leader, and then correlated these differences
within participant pairs. There was a positive correlation be-
tween the differences for the followers and the leaders within
the same pair [r(48) = .36, p = .011], suggesting that leaders
showed larger differences between conditions when their part-
ners did, too. Further corroborating our predictions, we found
a similar correlation in a separate experiment that was a direct
replication of Pfister et al. (2013) [r(24) = .53, p = .008; see the
supplemental material for details about the replication exper-
iment]. Interestingly, such a correlation was not significant in
Experiment 1, in which leaders could not see the followers
[r(24) = .04, p > .250].
Moreover, we investigated whether the leader’s RT on the
current trial could be predicted by her partner’s RT on the
preceding trial. We ran a linear mixed-effect model with by-
participants random intercepts and slopes, and with no corre-
lations between the random effects (the maximal-structure
model did not converge). We specified the follower’s RT on
the preceding trial as a predictor of the leader’s RT on the
current trial, and found that the leader’s action was faster,
the faster her partner’s action had been on the preceding trial
(B = 4.60, t = 2.65). This effect was qualified by a significant
interaction with condition (B = –8.50, t = –2.53; Fig. S2, panel
b). In counterimitation, we found a positive relationship (B =
8.91, t = 3.23), indicating local adaptation. In imitation, how-
ever, no significant association emerged (B = 0.14, t = 0.07),
most likely because the followers acted in response to a ran-
domly timed GO signal, which rendered adaptation not pos-
sible. Finally, a significant association between the follower’s
RTon the previous trial and the leader’s RTon the current trial
was also present in our replication of Pfister et al. (2013) (B =
7.91, t = 2.14; Fig. S2, panel c). To the contrary, no such
association was apparent in Experiment 1, indicating that local
temporal adaptation was not possible without perceptual feed-
back (B = –1.38, t = –0.68; Fig. S2, panel a).2
General discussion
Taken together, our findings demonstrate that spontaneous
adaptation of response speed, and not high-level anticipation
of partners’ actions, is the key mechanism at play in this task.
The response facilitation among leaders (Pfister et al., 2013)
disappeared once we removed auditory and visual information
about their partners’ behavior, suggesting that perceptual feed-
back was necessary for the emergence of this effect (Exp. 1).
Crucially, we showed that the effect among leaders can also be
reversed by manipulating the followers’ RT pattern (Exp. 2).
When followers responded faster in counterimitation than in
imitation, leaders were also faster in the former than in the
latter condition. This occurred despite the fact that followers’
2 We found a corresponding pattern of results in an additional cross-
correlation analysis: The leader’s RT on the current trial was positively
correlated with the follower’s RT on the previous trial in Experiment 2
and in the replication experiment, but not in Experiment 1 (see the
supplemental material).
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responses were still incompatible in counterimitation and
compatible in imitation.
Therefore, our results are not consistent with the high-level
anticipation account. Leaders’ behavior was influenced by the
temporal features of the followers’ responses, and we found
no evidence that leaders formed abstract representations of
their partners’ actions (i.e., represented those actions as being
either short or long). We propose that our findings are better
explained by a low-level mechanism of spontaneous temporal
adaptation. In support of this claim, the magnitude of the con-
dition difference for the leader was correlated with the mag-
nitude of the condition difference for the follower in the same
pair only if the partners could observe each other (i.e., in Exp.
2 and our replication of Pfister et al., 2013, but not in Exp. 1).
This is in line with previous studies showing that temporal
adaptation is contingent on perceptual information uptake
(Nowicki, Prinz, Grosjean, Repp, & Keller, 2013;
Richardson, Marsh, & Schmidt, 2005). Moreover, when
leaders could observe followers, the leaders’RTon the current
trial was predicted by the followers’ RTon the preceding trial.
This indicates that the adaptation occurred locally, on a trial-
by-trial basis. Similarly, a recent study revealed that dyads
engaged in a joint tapping task showed mutual temporal ad-
aptation on a tap-to-tap basis (Konvalinka et al., 2010).
In light of our findings, we argue for a reconsideration of
other phenomena that have traditionally been explained by
appealing solely to high-level processes. There is already ev-
idence that agents do not form representations of their part-
ner’s actions when the partner is outside their peripersonal
space (Guagnano, Rusconi, & Umiltà, 2010), which is consis-
tent with an important role for perceptual feedback. More
importantly, apparent evidence for action co-representation
(Sebanz, Knoblich, & Prinz, 2003) can be obtained when the
partner is inactive or is replaced with an attention-grabbing
object (Dolk, Hommel, Prinz, & Liepelt, 2013). Recent, more
parsimonious accounts of joint action have posited that agents
do not always need to represent and anticipate each others’
actions (Vesper, Butterfill, Knoblich, & Sebanz, 2010; Wenke
et al., 2011). We suggest that low-level mechanisms like tem-
poral adaptation should be considered whenever investigating
human coordination (cf. Richardson, Campbell, & Schmidt,
2009; Vesper & Richardson, 2014).
Finally, it is important to note that we do not argue that
anticipation plays no role in joint action. Agents flexibly
switch between different coordination processes, given the
task constraints (e.g., Skewes, Skewes, Michael, &
Konvalinka, 2015; Vesper, Schmitz, Safra, Sebanz, &
Knoblich, 2016), so anticipation of the coactor’s actions may
be involved in some instances of coordination. Moreover, re-
cent accounts of rhythmic joint action suggest that agents an-
ticipate the temporal features of their coactor’s action and that
coordination depends on both temporal anticipation and adap-
tation (Keller, Novembre, & Hove, 2014; Konvalinka et al.,
2010; van der Steen & Keller, 2013). Future research should
aim to uncover the relationship between anticipation and ad-
aptation, and should further investigate the role of task struc-
ture in eliciting different coordination mechanisms. Our re-
sults show that it is essential for researchers to consider both
the high- and low-level perspectives when building and test-
ing theoretical frameworks of joint action. Only then will
these models offer robust explanations and reflect the rich
interplay between different mechanisms that shape human
coordination.
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